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DLD-138

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 19-1251
____________
IN RE: ROY L. WILLIAMS,
Petitioner
__________________________________
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from
the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Related to D.C. Civ. No. 2-04-cv-04057)
__________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Fed. R. App. Pro. 21
March 21, 2019

Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR. and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 13, 2019)
____________
OPINION*
____________

PER CURIAM
Petitioner Roy L. Williams petitions for a writ of mandamus. For the reasons that
follow, we will deny the petition.
Williams was convicted of first degree murder in the Philadelphia County Court of
Common Pleas in connection with the shooting death of James P. McDonnell. Following
the penalty hearing, the jury found one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating

circumstances and set the penalty at death. Post-verdict motions were argued and denied
and the trial court imposed a sentence of death. Williams’ sentence was affirmed on
direct appeal, see Commonwealth v. Williams, 660 A.2d 1316 (Pa. 1995) (“Williams I”).
Williams filed a petition for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 9541-9546, through counsel, Billy Nolas and James H. Moreno
of the Defender Association of Philadelphia. The state post-conviction court denied
relief. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded for further proceedings to determine: (1) whether trial counsel was ineffective
during the penalty phase for failing to make a sufficient argument for life imprisonment
and for failing to investigate, develop and present significant mitigating evidence; and (2)
whether trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase for failing to present a
defense of diminished capacity, see Commonwealth v. Williams, 732 A.2d 1167 (Pa.
1999) (“Williams II”). Following an evidentiary hearing, the state post-conviction court
again denied relief. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, see
Commonwealth v. Williams, 846 A.2d 105 (Pa. 2004) (“Williams III”). The court held,
in pertinent part, that trial counsel’s failure to investigate and present a diminished
capacity defense did not constitute ineffective assistance, and that Williams was not
prejudiced by counsel’s failure to present his history of abuse and mental illness at
sentencing.
On August 25, 2004, Williams filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
through his counsel, Nolas and Moreno, alleging numerous guilt and penalty phase
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grounds for relief. The District Court granted Williams a stay of execution shortly
thereafter. Williams filed a memorandum of law in support of his § 2254 petition on
April 14, 2009; the District Attorney of Philadelphia submitted his answer to the § 2254
petition on June 25, 2010; and Williams then filed his reply memorandum on August 8,
2013. The District Court held argument on the petition on September 12, 2013, and
Williams submitted additional briefing thereafter on May 27, 2014, February 5, 2015,
April 7, 2016, and July 1, 2016. Meanwhile on April 7, 2016, Mathew C. Lawry of the
Capital Habeas Unit of the Federal Community Defender entered his appearance on
Williams’ behalf.
On August 9, 2016, nearly 12 years after the § 2254 petition was filed, Williams,
through counsel, filed a motion for discovery, seeking disclosure of any documents in the
possession of the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office reflecting former District
Attorney Ronald Castille’s personal involvement in his case. That motion was based on
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Terrance Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S.
Ct. 1899 (2016). At the same time, Williams was pursuing a new state post-conviction
petition, alleging that the participation of Justice Ronald Castile in his direct and
collateral appeals violated his right to due process.
On October 27, 2016, Williams filed a pro se motion for appointment of new §
2254 counsel, see Docket Entry No. 87. Williams argued that he was seeking relief
pursuant to Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (holding that a claim that state postconviction counsel was ineffective is not cognizable in federal habeas but may qualify as
cause to excuse default of substantial claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel), and
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that, because of a conflict of interest, his current habeas counsel could not represent him.
Thereafter, Williams filed a series of pro se motions, including, but not limited to, a
motion to proceed pro se, see Docket Entry No. 91; motions for leave to amend his §
2254 petition, see Docket Entry Nos. 92, 109 & 115; motions for substitute counsel, see
Docket Entry Nos. 101 & 102; and a motion for a status conference, see Docket Entry
No. 117. All of Williams’ pro se motions remain pending before the District Court.
Meanwhile, his capital habeas counsel continued to litigate on his behalf. On June
5 and July 20, 2017, the District Court, pursuant to the District Attorney’s motion, stayed
the § 2254 proceedings and placed them in suspense pending completion of the new postconviction proceedings in state court. On November 28 and 29, 2017, the Philadelphia
Court of Common Pleas entered orders terminating and dismissing those proceedings and
Williams chose not to appeal. Counsel then moved to reactivate the federal habeas
proceedings and the District Court granted that motion on December 15, 2017. On June
6, 2018, habeas counsel filed an unopposed motion on Williams’ behalf for production of
Williams’ state Department of Corrections institutional and medical records, see Docket
Entry No. 113. Counsel asserted that “the parties have entered into negotiations in an
effort to resolve this case, at least in part” and that the requested “records would facilitate
the negotiations.” Id. On June 5, 2018, the District Court granted that motion and
ordered the production of the requested records. Then, on September 12, 2018 -- and
shortly after Williams filed his pro se motion for a status conference -- the District Court
ordered that the matter be placed in civil suspense.
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Williams now files an amended petition for writ of mandamus, seeking an order
compelling the District Court to decide his pro se motions, including Docket Entry Nos.
87, 91- 92, 101-02, 107-12, 115, 117, and 119-20. 1 Williams alleges that the delay in
deciding his pro se motions violates his due process rights.
We will deny the petition. A writ of mandamus is an extreme remedy that is
available only in extraordinary situations. See Kerr v. United States District Court, 426
U.S. 394, 402 (1976). To justify its use, a petitioner must show both a clear and
indisputable right to the writ and that he has no other adequate means to obtain the relief
desired. See Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992). The
management of its docket is committed to the sound discretion of the District Court. In
re: Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982). When a matter is
discretionary, it cannot typically be said that a litigant’s right is “clear and indisputable.”
Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daifon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35-36 (1980). Nevertheless, a writ of
mandamus may be warranted where undue delay is tantamount to a failure to exercise
jurisdiction. Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996).
Generally, pro se litigants have no right to “hybrid representation” because “[a]
defendant does not have a constitutional right to choreograph special appearances by
counsel.” McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984). Here, Williams continues to
be represented by the Capital Habeas Unit, and his counsel are actively litigating his case.
1

We will treat the amended petition filed on February 19, 2019 as having superseded the
original petition filed on January 30, 2019. Cf. New Rock Asset Partners, L.P. v.
Preferred Entity Advancements, Inc., 101 F.3d 1492, 1504 (3d Cir. 1996) (amended
complaint supersedes original and renders original of no legal effect).
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Id. (“Once a pro se defendant invites or agrees to any substantial participation by counsel,
subsequent appearances by counsel must be presumed to be with the defendant’s
acquiescence, at least until the defendant expressly and unambiguously ... request[s] that
... counsel be silenced.”). Certainly Williams may request to proceed pro se, id., and his
pro se motions to replace current habeas counsel and amend his § 2254 petition have
been pending for over two years. Nevertheless, current habeas counsel have been active
on his behalf during that time period, especially with respect to recent attempts at
“negotiations in an effort to resolve this case, at least in part.” Until those negotiations
are successfully completed or break down, there is no reason for the District Court to act
on Williams’ pro se motions. The District Court may, however, wish to require the
parties to provide status reports every 30 days regarding their discussions.
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.
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